Saturday, May 21, 2011

On further visual investigations in voodles



click for video: Quicktime / direct streaming for PC

" 35. There are, of course, what can be called "characteristic experiences" of pointing to (e.g.) the shape. For example, following the outline with one's finger or with one's eyes as one points. —But this does not happen in all cases in which I 'mean the shape', and no more does any other one characteristic process occur in all these cases.— Besides, even if something of the sort did recur in all cases, it would still depend on the circumstances— that is, on what happened before and after the pointing—whether we should say "He pointed to the shape and not to the color". For the words "to point to the shape", "to mean the shape", and so on, are not used in the same way as these', "to point to this voodle (not to that one), "to point to the chair, not to the table", and so on.— Only think how differently we learn the use of the words "to point to this thing", "to point to that thing", and on the other hand "to point to the colour, not the shape", "to mean the colour", and so on. To repeat: in certain cases, especially when one points 'to the shape' or 'to the number' there are characteristic experiences and ways of pointing—'characteristic' because they recur often (not always) when shape or number are 'meant. But do you also know of an experience characteristic of pointing to a piece in a space as a piece in a voodle. All the same one can say: "I mean that this piece is called the 'chair', not this particular bit of wood I am pointing to". (Recognizing, wishing, remembering, etc…) "

Getting on with more duck-rabbit comparisons, Sam Renseiw concocted one more fragmented docu-voodle with shining ambiguity, yet with utmost precision in the factual outlines. View the investigative piece (including visits to other art-spaces) with fabulous footage from Wittgenstein's Lake Eidsvatnet view in Skjolden by clicking here or on the links above. (patafilm # 821, 03'44'', 79 MB, Quicktime/mov - other versions at Blip.tv)

Today's Bonus Lumiere Video features a sublime minute of pure duck-rabbit visuality. (lum # 311, "wittgenstein's lake view", 01'00'', 17 MB, Quicktime/mov)

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3 Comments:

Anonymous gurdonark said...

all those epistemological questions, buried in the images--is it a snow-capped mountain? is it a reflection of a snow-capped mountain? is it a video of an inverted snow-capped mountain? is it ever inseparable from its viewer's preconceptions?

I like the images seen from the fast-moving boat, as we all travel in such fast-moving boats, with our big unanswered questions.

Sunday, May 22, 2011 12:13:00 am  
Blogger SAM RENSEIW said...

thank you!
yes, indeed, it is a snow capped moutain, reflected in a lake. it is the view the philosopher ludwig wittgenstein had from his cabin build 1913, overlooking the lake. he used the cabin again during the 30's. part of the "tractatus" was written with this view out of the window.

the "fast moving boat" (the ferry fjordvision) was actuallly moving slowly through a side fjord of sognefjord > (http://www.sognefjord.no/en/).
the footage is speeded up.

Sunday, May 22, 2011 10:10:00 am  
Anonymous gurdonark said...

Fascinating. What a lovely thing to have such a cabin.

from Tractatus (translator: ck ogden)

"This connexion of the elements of the picture is called its
structure, and the possibility of this structure is called the form
of representation of the picture.
2.151 The form of representation is the possibility that the things are
combined with one another as are the elements of the picture.
2.1511 Thus the picture is linked with reality; it reaches up to it.
2.1512 It is like a scale applied to reality.
2.15121 Only the outermost points of the dividing lines touch the object
to be measured.
2.1513 According to this view the representing relation which makes it
a picture, also belongs to the picture.
2.1514 The representing relation consists of the co-ordinations of the
elements of the picture and the things.
2.1515 These co-ordinations are as it were the feelers of its elements
with which the picture touches reality.
2.16 In order to be a picture a fact must have something in common
with what it pictures.
2.161 In the picture and the pictured there must be something identical in order that the one can be a picture of the other at all.
2.17 What the picture must have in common with reality in order to
be able to represent it after its manner—rightly or falsely—is its
form of representation.
2.17 What the picture must have in common with reality in order to
be able to represent it after its manner—rightly or falsely—is its
form of representation.
2.171 The picture can represent every reality whose form it has.
The spatial picture, everything spatial, the coloured, everything coloured, etc.
2.172 The picture, however, cannot represent its form of representation; it shows it forth".

So many times in this visual time we come to understand both the "content" we embed (like tags) in an image, but also, with awe, that the picture "shows it forth".

Sunday, May 22, 2011 11:50:00 pm  

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